












British Diplomatic and Strategic Approach to the 
Formation of the ANZUS Treaty System,  
1951—Quest for a Treaty-Military Strategy 
Formation for Serving Imperial Defense Interests 
inside the Network of Western Military Alliances
柴 山 　 太
Futoshi Shibayama
To the United Kingdom and the United States, in 1951, both Australia and New Zealand 
could provide rare military troops in the network of Western military alliances, which 
could be projected into either the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or the Far East for fighting 
against the Soviets and/or the Chinese in possible Third World War or limited war(s). This 
indicates that Western military alliances were closely connected as a network. In it, the 
British intensely endeavored to realize their favorite formulation of the ANZUS Treaty, 
though they hardly intended to be its member. The U.K. intended to change the nature 
of this treaty, from what Australia and New Zealand originally intended, namely first, of 
course, against Russian invasion to both countries in the all-out war, second, for defending 
British interests in the Middle East and, third, against possible revival of Japanese military 
threat, to British strategic design, which, while maintaining Australian and NZ mission of 
defending the Middle East, added, first, a new mission of preparing for possible Chinese 
local invasion(s) to Southeast Asia, and, second, ‘bestowing’ on Australian and NZ divi-
sions a new mission of militarily compensating for possible redeployment of three U.K. di-
visions for homeland defense against possible Soviet landing campaign, though originally 
these British divisions were destined to fight in the Middle East. Furthermore, Britain en-
couraged both Australia and New Zealand to drop any request for the U.S. to include any 
formal armament regulation in a coming peace treaty with Japan.
キーワード： アンザス条約、イギリス外交、イギリス軍事戦略、西側軍事同盟網
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サー・キース・オフィサ （ーSir Keith Officer）は、
1950年10月13日付の覚書に、前日（12日）の昼食会














る。本のタイトルどおりの水準に収まった感がある。W. David McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and 



































































る英国参謀長委員会（Chiefs of Staff Committee-
COS）は ア ン ザ ム 参 謀 本 部（ANZAM Chiefs of 
Staff－英豪NZ軍代表から構成されるものの豪軍
がその中心）にマラヤ防衛を任せるべきで、その
3 (Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: the ANZUS Treaty 1951 (Canberra, 
2001) p. 27. (Hereafter this volume is abbreviated as the ANZUS Treaty 1951). See also McIntyre, op. cit., pp. 286-287.
4 参照、拙稿「なぜ1946年に米豪NZ安全保障取り決めができなかったのか？」（近刊予定）。
5 The ANZUS Treaty 1951, p. 34.
6 Ibid., p. 44.
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7 Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation In South-East Asia, 1945-49 (London, 1995) pp. 184-5; Annex I to JP (50) 97 (Final) 
(September 21, 1950); "Australian Defence Committee Minute No. 87/1950: Strategic Planning in Relation to Co-operation in British 
Commonwealth Defence: High Command in War in the ANZAM Region," Appendix "B" to Annex III to JP (50) 97 (September 21, 1950) 























































































































































9 Washington to Foreign Office, No. 129 (January 12, 1951) PREM 8/1404.
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リ ック・ シ ェダ ン（Permanent Secretary of the 





















10 “Pacific Defence Pact: Copy of a Letter dated 24th January, 1951 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee,” 
COS (51) 40 (January 25, 1951) DEFE 5/27; JP (51) 14 (Final) (January 26, 1951) DEFE 4/39; “Item 2: Pacific Defence Council,” 
Confidential Annex to COS (51) 21st Mtg. (January 29, 1951) DEFE 4/39; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 



































































12 “Item 1: Meeting with Sir Frederick Shedden,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 22nd Mtg. (January 31, 1951) DEFE 4/39; SAC (50) 1st 
Mtg. (January 2, 1950) CAB 134/670. 参照、拙著『日本再軍備への道』、第6章。
13 “Copy of a Letter dated 31st January, 1951 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary Chiefs of Staff committee” COS (51) 51 (February 1, 
1951); COS (51) 57 (February 6, 1951) DEFE 5/27. 2月5日会議では、COSはJPに対して、次の4つの問題を検討するように命令した。すな
わち(1)北朝鮮軍が大々的に拡充して、朝鮮から中国軍が撤退する可能性、(2)アメリカが国民党軍を使用する可能性を示唆した場合への対
応、(3)まだ、朝鮮に派兵していない国々の貢献についての研究、(4)中国軍が北朝鮮から撤収した場合に、南朝鮮の防衛を全面的に韓国軍
にまかせる可能性であった。COS (51) 24th Mtg. (February 5, 1951) DEFE 4/40; JP (51) 25 (Final) (February 8, 1951) DEFE 4/40; “Item 4: 
Preparations for the Defence of Malaya,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 23rd Mtg. (February 2, 1951) DEFE 4/39.
8





































































14 COS (51) 32nd Mtg. (February 16, 1951); “Annex II: Copy of agreed draft telegram from C.R.O. to U.K. High Commissioner, Canberra 
repeated U.K. High Commissioner, Wellington, Singapore and Saving to Washington, Tokyo and Manila”; COS (51) 37th Mtg. (February 
26, 1951) DEFE 4/40; COS, “Untitled” (February 27, 1951) FO 371/92071.
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（Lord Tedder, Chief of Joint Staff Mission-JSM）
をつうじて米軍最高首脳組織である統合参謀本部











エスラー・デニング（Sir Maberly Esler Dening, 
Chief of Far Eastern Division）はスペンダー豪外
相との会談で、豪州・NZ側が米国側から何らか
の安全保障を求める気持は解るが、「日本が［将
来］参加するかもしれない条約」（a pact to which 













































15 COS (51) 37th Mtg. (February 26, 1951) DEFE 4/40.
16 U.K. High Commissioner in Australia to U.K. High Commissioners in New Zealand and South Africa, Commissioner General Singapore, 
and Washington, No. 96 (February 15, 1951) FO 371/92071.
17 D.W.S. Hunt to M.H.G. Rogers (CRO) (February 22, 1951); Commonwealth of Australia, “Untitled” (February 22, 1951) FO 371/92072. こ
の豪州側メモの元となったのが、前日（2月21日）付のメンジー豪首相からロンドンのエリック・J・ハリソン（Eric J. Harrison）に宛てられ
た電報と思われる。The ANZUS, 1951, pp. 94-99.
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18 Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 606 (February 28, 1951); R.H. Scott, “Untitled” (March 7, 1951); P.C. Gordon Walker to 
Robert Menzies (March 13, 1951); E.G. Cass to E.J. Emery (CRO) (March 13, 1951) FO 371/92072. なお、内閣の承認も3月12日に受け
ている。“Pacific Pact” (March 12, 1951); P.C. Gordon Walker to Robert Menzies (March 13, 1951); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High 
Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand, No. 238 and No. 144 (March 13, 1951); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High Commissioners 
in Australia and New Zealand, No. 237 and No. 143 (March 13, 1951) FO 371/92072.
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スク極東担当国務次官補（Dean Rusk, Assistant 










19 U.K. High Commissioner in New Zealand (Doidge) to Commonwealth Relations Office, No. 196 (D. March 23, 1951, R. March 22, 1951); 
Foreign Office to Washington, No. 1194 (March 29, 1951) FO 371/92072.
20 “Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Resident Minister for Australia-
Thursday, 22nd March, 1951” (F 1072/36); “Message from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to Mr. Gordon-Walker,” (March 
22, 1951) FO 371/92073.
12

































































21 Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 934 (March 30, 1951) (F 1072/37); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High Commissioners in 
Australia and New Zealand, No. 298 and No. 178 (April 2, 1951); Foreign Office to Washington, No. 1277 (April 3, 1951); Washington 
(Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 1029 (D. April 6, 1951, R. April 7, 1951) (F 1072/40); Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 1137 (April 
14, 1951) (F 1072/42) F 371/92073.
22 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pts. 1 & 2, pp. 132-133; p. 1366.
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23 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt. 1, p. 133.
24 Ibid., p. 141. McIntyre, op. cit., p. 296.
25 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt. 1, p. 135; p. 137; p. 145; p. 150.
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26 Ibid., pp. 148-149. マッキンタイヤによれば、ニュージーランドはすでに中東派遣用の徴兵を開始し、3万3千から3万5千人の兵力派遣を準





27 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt. 1, pp. 154-155.
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（Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General of the 










約体制は不可能としていた。The ANZUS, 1951, p.72.
29 JCS-2180/10 (April 7, 1951) CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 2, RG 218, (US) National Archives II, College Park, MD.
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30 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt. 1, pp. 193-194.
31 Ibid., pp. 197-199.
32 Ibid., p. 200; Decision on JCS-2180/12 (April 11, 1951) CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 2, RG 218.
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33 COS (51) 44th Mtg. (March 7, 1951); JP (51) 12 (Final) (March 2, 1951) DEFE 4/40; COS (51) 49th Mtg. (March 16, 1951); JP (51) 54 (Final) 
(March 30, 1951) DEFE 4/41.
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35 Ibid; “Item 6: Meeting with Sir Oliver Franks-H.M. Ambassador in Washington,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 48th Mtg. (March 14, 
1951); COS (51) 51st Mtg. (March 21, 1951); COS (51) 63rd Mtg. (April 11, 1951) DEFE 4/41.
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ジョージ・クリーシー大将（Vice Chief of Naval 





















36 “Item 1: Policy in Korea,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 59 Mtg. (April 6, 1951); “Item 1: Policy in Korea,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 
61st Mtg. (April 9, 1951); “Item 4: Departure of General MacArthur,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 65th Mtg. (April 13, 1951) DEFE 
4/41.
37 COS (51) 66th Mtg. (April 16, 1951); “Item 6: Policy in Korea,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 68th Mtg. (April 18, 1951); COS (51) 71st 
Mtg. (April 25, 1951) DEFE 4/41; “Item 8: Policy In Korea,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 73rd Mtg. (April 30, 1951) DEFE 4/42.
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38 “Item 1: Discussions with the French,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 63th Mtg. (April 11, 1951) DEFE 4/41. とはいえ、5月17日付の「短
期における欧州防衛」と題されたJPレポートによれば、核兵器を戦略・戦術的にうまく使用しないかぎり、ライン川の線でソ連軍の侵攻を
止めることは不可能であると判断されていた。JP (51) 33 (Final) (May 17, 1951) DEFE 4/42. その一方で、イタリア・オーストリア地域で
橋頭堡を維持する可能性が議論されており、この作戦が成功すれば、地中海における補給線維持が容易になるとされた。これが、英連邦
軍による中東作戦をさらに容易にすることは明白であった。COS (51) 65th Mtg. (April 13, 1951) DEFE 4/41.
39 COS (51) 65th Mtg. (April 13, 1951) DEFE 4/41. これ以前に、ブラウンジョン英帝国陸軍参謀次長は、4月2日のCOS（VCOSレベル）会議に
おいて、豪州・NZのオブザーバーが英米仏軍事協議に参加する重要性を強調していた。COS (51) 57th Mtg. (April 2, 1951); COS (51) 72nd 
Mtg. (April 27, 1951); JP (51) 77 (Final) (April 25, 1951); JP (51) 78 (Final) (April 24, 1951) DEFE 4/41; “Item 7: Tripartite Military Staff 
Talks on the Defence of South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 73rd Mtg. (April 30, 1951); JP (51) 81 (April 27, 1951) DEFE 
4/42.
40 “Item 7: Tripartite Military Staff Talks on the Defence of South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 73rd Mtg. (April 30, 1951); 
“Item 1: Military Staff Talks on the Defence of South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 75th Mtg. (May 2, 1951) DEFE 4/42.
41 “Item 3: Defence of Malaya,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 78th Mtg. (May 7, 1951) DEFE 4/42.
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42 “Item 3: Defence Policy for Hong Kong,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 81st Mtg. (May 16, 1951); JP (51) 84 (Final) (May 10, 1951) DEFE 
4/42.
43 JP (51) 84 (Final) (May 10, 1951); “Item 3: Defence Policy for Hong Kong,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 81st Mtg. (May 16, 1951) DEFE 
4/42; “Item 3: Discussion with Lord Tedder,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 86th Mtg. (May 23, 1951); “Item 3: Defence Policy for Hong 
Kong,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 89th Mtg. (May 30, 1951); JP (51) 84 (Revised Final) (May 19, 1951) DEFE 4/43. JPの修正されたレ
ポートには、不足している陸上兵力は2個師団と書かれていた。“Item 3: Defence Policy for Hong Kong,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 
89th Mtg. (May 30, 1951) DEFE 4/43.
22
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フランシス・フォガーティ大将（Commander-in-



































































44 COS (51) 89th Mtg. (May 30, 1951) DEFE 4/43.
45 Ibid.
46 FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt. 1, p. 199.
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47 JP (51) 82 (Final) (May 30, 1951); “Item 2: Defence of the Middle East-1951/1954,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 93rd Mtg. (June 6, 1951) 
DEFE 4/43.
48 “Item 4: Defence Policy and Global Strategy (Revision of DO (50) 45),” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 93rd Mtg. (June 6, 1951); JP (51) 90 
(Final) (May 29, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951) DEFE 4/43.
49 Ibid; Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951) DEFE 4/43.
50 Ibid. 英米間では、1951年2月に、英国側が担当するアンザム地域と米国側が担当する太平洋地域の線引きがすでに議論されていた。一応
の線引きはなされたが、米国側はあまりアンザム地域を尊重するつもりはなかった。See JP (51) 68 (Final) (May 4, 1951); COS (51) 96th 
Mtg. (June 11, 1951); JP (51) 86 (June 7, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 86 (June 7, 1951) DEFE 4/44.
24

























































51 “Item 1: Meeting with General Bradley-Chairman United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 94th Mtg. (June 8, 
1951) DEFE 4/43. この会議では、対中貿易問題が議論され、スリムは、「香港を経由して中国に入った資材（materials）の多くが日本から
委託されたものであった」とした後、まだ日本と中国大陸の間には貿易が続いていると指摘した。ブラッドレーは、この問題をワシントン
に知らせると答えた。“Item 1: Meeting with Sir Oliver Franks,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 105th Mtg. (June 27, 1951) DEFE 4/44.
52 Annex to JP (51) 2 (Final) (June 26, 1951) DEFE 4/44. 1952年9月開戦を前提としたJPレポートにおいては、中国軍が開戦劈頭から東南ア
ジアに侵攻し、1953年1月にはインドシナのトンキン地域が陥落し、1953年後半にはいってからマラヤへの直接侵攻があると予想されて
いた。JPは、マラヤ領内の国内治安が保たれ、十分な米の供給が可能であれば、マラヤは軍事的には防衛可能であるとしていたが、この
二つの条件が揃うことはないとされ、マラヤとシンガポールは陥落すると結論付けられていた。Annex to JP (51) 2 (Final) (June 26, 1951); 
“Item 2: Command in the Far East and South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 112th Mtg. (July 6, 1951) DEFE 4/44; JP (51) 
70 (Final) (July 2, 1951) DEFE 4/45. 7月6日のCOS会議において、外務省のスコットは、朝鮮戦争の停戦交渉について報告し、ソ連のほう
が戦争を止めたがっているが、中国は時間稼ぎの手段と考えているという印象を伝えた。また、中国は、インドシナに新たな戦争を始め
るよりも、朝鮮で新攻勢に出てくる、と彼は判断していた。“Item 3: Arrangements for an Armistice In Korea,” Confidential Annex to 
COS (51) 112th Mtg. (July 6, 1951) DEFE 4/44.
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'D' to Annex II to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951) DEFE 4/46. 兵力不足を補うために、極東・東南アジアから、とりわけマラヤから
の戦術用の3個飛行中隊等を中心に派遣することを、「シンデレラ」は提案していた。Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951) DEFE 
4/46.





































































た。国防相付き主席参謀将校（Chief Staff Officer 
to the Minister of Defence）サ ・ーケネス・マクリー
ン中将（Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth McLean）は、ノル
マンディー上陸作戦がいかに大変であったかを例
57 Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951) DEFE 4/46.
58 “Item 2: Plan Cinderella,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 143rd Mtg. (September 12, 1951); COS (51) 131st Mtg. (August 16, 1951); COS (51) 
133rd Mtg. (August 20, 1951); JP (51) 114 (Final) (August 27, 1951) DEFE 4/46.
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形成され価値を持つかもしれない」（some form of 
regional association may be found in due course 

























59 “Offensive Measures which Might Be Taken to Reduce the Scale of Air Attack on the United Kingdom During the Years 1951/1957,” 
Confidential Annex to COS (51) 97th Mtg. (June 13, 1951); COS (51) 99 Mtg. (June 18, 1951) DEFE 4/44; COS (51) 116th Mtg. (July 16, 
1951) DEFE 4/45; COS (51) 128th Mtg. (August 10, 1951) DEFE 4/46.
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60 JP (51) 151 (Final) (August 27, 1951); “(A) Defence Planning-South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 139th Mtg. (September 3, 
1951) DEFE 4/46.
61 JP (51) 118 (Final) (September 13, 1951) DEFE 4/47. フィリップ・A・M・マクブライド豪国防相代理（Acting Minister of Defence Phillip 
A. M. McBride）は、マラヤ問題と豪州世論の関係を心配する書簡を英国政府に送りつけていた。JP (51) 120 (Final) (September 13, 1951) 
DEFE 4/47. この時期、英軍部は、世界戦争時、マラヤへの中国軍侵攻を戦争開始後9ヶ月半と予想し、1個英グルカ歩兵師団と1個歩兵旅
団を中心にした部隊がマラヤを防衛するという方針を取っていた。“Appendix to Letter from Mr. Shinwell to Mr. McBride: the Threat to 
Malaya,” Appendix to Annex to JP (51) 120 (Final) (September 13, 1951); “Item 4: Strategic Concept for the Anzam Area,” Confidential 
Annex to COS (51) 148th Mtg. (September 21, 1951) DEFE 4/47.
62 JP (51) 152 (Final) (August 27, 1951) DEFE 4/46; PAO/P (51) 63 (September 27, 1951); JP (51) 162 (Final) (October 1, 1951) DEFE 4/47.
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63 COS (51) 155th Mtg. (October 4, 1951) DEFE 4/47.
64 The ANZUS Treaty 1951, p. 213.
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65 本論文と関連する最近の研究に、ビクター・D・チャーのものがある。Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: the Origins of the American Alliance 
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